History of the Wax Portrait, published in 1911 by Julius von Schlosser, borrowed its vocabulary from Schlosser's friend Aby Warburg (though also directly from Edward Tylor) 1 and demonstrated that "afterlife" offered the only route to understanding the most peculiar aspect of wax sculpture: its long duration, its resistance to the history of styles, its capacity to survive without exhibiting significant evolution. 2 The history of images, in Schlosser's sense, is in no way a "natural history" but instead an elaboration and a methodological construction; that his history escapes the laws of conventional evolutionism tends to justify his trenchant critique, at the close of the book, of Vasarian teleological pretensions. Presumably Schlosser, through modesty rather than ignorance, left undeveloped a few theoretical problems inherent to survival as a model. 4 Nevertheless, an idea of considerable significance began to take shape in his book: Whereas art has a history, images have survivals -survivals that discredit them, banish them from the sphere of accredited high art. In return, the history of artistic styles (the history credited by high culture) holds their survival in contempt. 5 It is no surprise, then, that Schlosser's History of the Wax Portrait has long been read by anthropologists rather than art historians.
Edgar Wind probably never risked a theoretical choice as exploratory and radical as those of Warburg and Schlosser. Still, Wind clearly understood that Nachleben had to be used as more than a mundanely biological metaphor. "When we refer to the survival of Antiquity," he wrote in 1934, "we mean that the symbols created by the Ancients have continued to exert their power on successive
generations; but what do we mean by 'continue'?" 6 Wind went on to show that survival entails a complex set of operations in which forgetting, the transformation of sense, involuntary memory, and unexpected rediscovery work in unisoncomplexities meant to remind us that the temporality at play is cultural rather than natural. Here, Wind's critique was not only of Heinrich Wölfflin's "immanent history," but of historical continuity in general. The presumption of continuity ignores, Wind held, what every survival entails: a play of "pauses" and "crises," of "leaps" and "periodic reversions," that together form, not a narrative account of the history in question, but a web of memory -not a succession of artistic facts, but a theory of symbolic complexity. 7
The critique of historicism implied by Warburg's hypothesis could not be stated more clearly than in Wind's rendering. Gertrud Bing has taken note of Warburg's paradoxical position in the epistemology of the historical sciences (it might be added that Michel Foucault's positioning is paradoxical in a similar way). On the one hand, Warburg could be occasionally incomplete in his analyses, biased, or even wrong about various historical facts and phenomena. On the other hand, his hypothesis about memory -the specific kind of memory supposed by Nachleben -must profoundly alter, if taken seriously, our understanding of what a historical phenomenon or fact is. Bing insisted on the way in which 5. Von Schlosser, Histoire du portrait en cire, 8. Schlosser had long been interested in the forms of the "survival of paganism" in Christian art. As he wrote in 1894: "The past is everywhere so lively and strong that the traces it has left in newer forms of culture must be quite deep" (von Schlosser, "Heidnische Elemente in der christlichen Kunst des Altertums," in Präludien, Vorträge und Aufsätze [Berlin: J. Bard, 1927], 9 -43) . the concept of Nachleben should transform our idea of tradition. No longer imaginable as an unbroken river, where accruals are carried from up-to downstream, tradition should, after Warburg, be conceived as a tense dialectic, a drama that unfolds between the river's flow and its whirling eddies. 8 Walter Benjamin thought of historicity in something like this way. 9 But it must be emphasized that few historians have taken Warburg's lesson on board. Historians in general prefer not to risk being wrong, so they embrace the idea of facts and condescend to speculation. We might call their attitude scientific modesty or cowardice or philosophical laziness; it may result from a positivist abhorrence of theory.
E. H. Gombrich, historian of culture par excellence (and at the time director of the Warburg Institute in London), intended his 1970 biography to put Aby Warburg's achievement in perspective; but if the book does so, it is from the standpoint of an Oedipus regarding his Laius. Evident throughout is Gombrich's desire that the ghost -the revenant, as Warburg was defining himself by 1924 -not return. 10 Gombrich's intent was to ensure that the outmoded hypothesis of survival not survive (or eternally return) in the back of art historians' minds. To achieve this end, two sorts of operation were required. First, Gombrich had to invalidate the dialectical structure of survival; that is, he had to deny that a double rhythm, comprising both survivals and renascences, organizes and renders hybrid or impure the temporality of images and motifs. Gombrich went so far as to claim that Warburg's survivals amount to nothing but revivals. 11 The second gambit on Gombrich's agenda -to invalidate the anachronistic structure of Nachleben -demanded no more than a return to Anton Springer, to Springer's reperiodization of the distinction between survival and renascence. In other words, Gombrich sought to reduce a theoretical distinction to one more simply chronological (between Middle Ages and Renaissance). He then finished the job by distinguishing the obscure "tenacity" of medieval survivals from the inventive "flexibility" of imitations all'antica, which only a renascence worthy of the name -the Renaissance of the fifteenth century -could produce. 12 11. Gombrich, Aby Warburg, 16: "The special problem of Kulturwissenschaft that Warburg had singled out as his principal concern was that of 'das Nachleben der Antike,' literally 'the afterlife of classical antiquity.' But this use of 'afterlife' is not current in English, and the nearest equivalent, 'survival,' was preempted by Burnett Tylor, who devoted chapters 3 and 4 of his book to 'Survivals in Culture'-by which he meant superstitions, children's games, and other residues of past phases in any given civilization. Warburg certainly wished Nachleben to comprise these survivals, but he was more concerned with what would now be described as 'revivals,' the reappearance in the Italian Renaissance of artistic forms and psychological states derived from the ancient world." See also Gombrich, "Aby Warburg and A. But Gombrich was not the high exorcising priest of our poltergeist; that honor belongs to Erwin Panofsky. However reluctantly, Gombrich himself acknowledged that Panofsky invalidated the concept of Nachleben for generations of art historians to come. 13 As early as 1921, Panofsky published an article titled "Dürer and Classical Antiquity" to rival and rectify Warburg's paper "Dürer and Italian Antiquity" (published fifteen years before). 14 Despite tributes paid to Warburg, the problematic of survivals yields in Panofsky's paper to one of influences-and the question of pathos, tied in Warburg's thinking to the Nietzschean Dionysiac, yields to a problematic of types and the beau idéal (supported by references to Kant and to classic rhetoricians). 15 In Panofsky's 1929 obituary for Warburg, the latter's key expression Nachleben der Antike goes unmentioned and all that is left of survival is
Rezeptionsgeschichte and "heritage" (Erbteil des Altertums). 16 In 1933 The earliest Italian writers about the history of art, such as for instance Ghiberti, Alberti, and especially Giorgio Vasari, thought that classical art was overthrown at the beginning of the Christian era and that it did not revive until, during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in Italy, it served as the foundation for what is usually called the Renaissance. . . . In thinking as they did the early writers were both right and wrong. They were wrong insofar as the Renaissance was connected with the Middle Ages by innumerable links. . . . Classical conceptions survived throughout the Middle Ages -literary, philosophical, scientific, and artistic-and they were especially strong after the time of Charlemagne, under whose reign there had been a deliberate classical revival in almost every cultural field. The early writers were right insofar as the artistic forms under which the classical conception persisted were utterly different from our present ideas of Antiquity, which did not come into existence until the "Renaissance" in its true sense of the "rebirth" of antiquity as a well-defined historical phenomenon. 19
These introductory remarks imply, not just an extension, but a dissociation or perhaps Panofsky and Saxl restore the Renaissance to its status as an artistic summit, a period of stylistic purity and archaeological authenticity. But they go further, defining the quattrocento and cinquecento as virtually the only time in which humanity, freed from the burdens of the conventional and the symbolic, has been true to itself: "The reintegration of classical mythological subjects achieved during the Renaissance was an incentive as well as a symptom of the general evolution which led to the rediscovery of man as a natural being stripped of his protective cover of symbolism and conventionality." 22 Not every anxiety or tension is displaced from this account (Panofsky and Saxl do invoke the CounterReformation: the end of the Renaissance). But only the "classical harmony" of the Renaissance "in its true sense" is said to transcend the artistic and cultural crises that survivals from the past revealed negatively or by default. 23 There remained only one conceptual difficulty to resolve: the Renaissance -the resurrection of a past time-contradicts the assumption of Nachleben on two levels not easily reconciled. The coincidence of the axiological and the chronological is not inevitable. Panofsky found an effective solution to the problem by distinguishing between two different orders or categories: the synchronic order that he calls "renovation"
and the "well-defined historical phenomenon" of the Renaissance. What is sometimes termed the Carolingian Renaissance is, for Panofsky, not a Renaissance but a renovation. The only Renaissance "in its true sense" is that of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. 24 As for survival, the concept was now tucked away in the haze of its relative imprecision. "protohumanist" moments, were in no way Renaissances in the strict sense of the term but only partial returns to antiquity, only renascences. 27 In order to resolve his initial problematic -the relationship between historical continuity and historical change 28 -Panofsky built a framework for understanding that, due to its three-part structure, resembles the famous semiological distinction that he makes among "primary subject matter, " "secondary or conventional subject matter, " and "intrinsic meaning or content" in the introduction to Studies in Iconology. 29 According to Panofsky, a tripartite hierarchy (ancient, medieval, modern) must structure the "theory of historical time," and at the top of it we find the Renaissance, whose capital R signals its chronological importance and timeless dignity -a dignity that Panofsky qualifies with Hegelian expressions like "selfrealization," "becoming aware," "becoming real," and "total phenomenon." 30 For Panofsky, Vasari (who, after all, said the same thing) was right. Art awakened to its own consciousness, its own history, realization, and ideal signification, in and through the Renaissance. The Middle Ages had left antiquity unburied and alternately galvanized and exorcised its corpse. The Renaissance stood weeping at its grave and tried to resurrect its soul. And in one fatally auspicious moment it succeeded. This is why the medieval concept of the Antique was so concrete and at the same time so incomplete and distorted; whereas the modern one, gradually developed during the last three or four hundred years, is comprehensive and consistent but, if I may say so, abstract. And this is why medieval renascences were transitory; whereas the Renaissance was permanent. Resurrected souls are intangible but have the advantage of immortality and omnipresence. 33 We recognize echoes, in this passage, of Vasari's and Winckelmann's eulogies ontheir corresponding idealizations of-the classical revivals of their respective eras.
It is legitimate, of course, to have and express preferences for resurrected souls over wandering ghosts (or vice versa). But Panofsky expressed his aesthetic and metaphorical preferences, here and elsewhere, in a discourse claiming that art history should be founded on scientific objectivity. Such objectivity apparently consists in the study of "well-defined historical phenomena" rather than vague survivals: the study of ideas (which are immortal like gods), not of images and motifs (which are undead like ghosts). Objective art history, moreover, recognizes that there is one historical moment, a canonical time, without impurity-the Renaissance-when the homogenous reintegration of form and content became perfectly legible. 34 Veritas filia temporis, as the antique adage goes. 35 But for the historian, a question remains: truth is the daughter of precisely which time -or of which times? As Warburg's disciple, Panofsky began by recognizing how attention to the history of images and motifs discloses the full complexity and anachronism of time. In a German text whose title translates as "The Problem of Historical Time, " Panofsky purposely relied on a medieval example to introduce the dilemma inherent in any evolutionary model of art history:
Indeed, where but in Reims could a group of sculptures offer so sumptuous a sight? It appears, in an endlessly shimmering fabric, that the most varied threads sometimes intertwine, sometimes create a rigorous network, sometimes move away from one another, never to be joined again. Just in itself, the differences in quality, which are at times considerable, prevent us from believing there has been a single evolutionary line. But, even beyond this example, distinct stylistic trends have not always developed in the same direction; they have moreover not always just interpenetrated -they have continued to exist side by side, in spite of all of the to-ing and fro-ing. . . . it seems that this infinite variety of "systems of reference," which, at a basic level, faces the art historian and constitutes a world, amounts to a monstrous chaos, to which it is all but impossible to lend form. . . . do we not find ourselves, then, facing a world that lacks homogeneity, a world in which frozen "systems of reference" cohabit (to use Simmel's terms) in self-sufficient isolation and irrational singularity? yet . . . without residue, there are only ideal wines -tasteless wines -wines lacking the impurities that, in a sense, give them their style, their life.
In pursuit of meaning in the visual arts, Panofsky hoped to get beyond the too Nietzschean or too Burkhardtian intuitions that had led to Warburg's obsession with the life and afterlife of images, their Leben and Nachleben. But now, in turn, Panofskian (or rather, post-Panofskian) iconology has become obsessed with symbols, ignorant of symptoms, too devoted to chronology, too ignorant of anachronisms. Our next requisite correction may depend on our understanding
Warburgian "survival" in the context of its dynamic -its morphological and metapsychological -consequence and implications.
The recoil from "survival" as a category of art historical attention is attributable to its basic impurity; Nachleben is impure in much the way Leben itself is.
Both are messy, cluttered, muddled, various, haphazard, retentive, protean, liquid, oceanic in scope and complexity, impervious to analytical organization.
There is no doubt that Panofsky sought to understand the meaning of motifs and images, but Warburg wanted much more: to understand their "life, " their "force"
or impersonal "power"-these are the terms (Leben, Kraft, Macht) that Warburg used but studiously refrained from defining. Gebhardt wrote of Burckhardt in 1887, "that he attributed the secret of the Renaissance; and by the word culture he meant the intimate state of the con- First, to the extent that life is a play of functions, it is neither a play of facts nor one of systems. We must speak tangibly -of a culture's life -as a rejoinder to positivist historiography (which tends to be reductively chronological, factual, and discursive) and as a rejoinder to idealist, especially Hegelian historiography (which tends to be reductively abstract, systematic, and fixated on truth). In both the idealist and positivist approaches, the historian disincarnates time by attempting to simplify (or rather, deny) its complexity. "Life as culture" might be a formula, given its dramatic difference from established ways of seeing, that is destined to break with the schematic (and thus trivial) choice we are generally offered between nature and history or between idea and history:
History is not the same as nature, and it creates, brings to birth and abandons to decay in different way. . . . By a primordial instinct, nature creates in consistently organic fashion with an infinite variety of species and a great similarity of individuals. In history, the variety (within the one species homo, of course) is far from being so great. There are no clear lines of demarcation, but individuals feel the incentive inequalityinciting to development. While nature works on a few primeval models (vertebrates and invertebrates, phanerogams and cryptograms), in the people, the body social is not so much a type as a gradual product. . . . We shall, further, make no attempt at system, nor lay any claim to "historical principles." On the contrary, we shall confine ourselves to observation, taking transverse sections of history in as many directions
Didi-Huberman • Peace and Mind: Part 5 283 as possible. Above all, we have nothing to do with the philosophy of history. . . . Hegel speaks also of the "purpose of eternal wisdom," and calls his study a theodicy by virtue of its recognition of the affirmative in which the negative (in popular parlance, evil) vanishes, subjected and overcome. . . . We are not, however, privy to the purposes of eternal wisdom: they are beyond our ken. This bold assumption of a world plan leads to fallacies because it starts out from false premises. 43 Having made this double refusal, Burckhardt commenced to write a third sort of history. 44 Warburg would come to elucidate the fundamental commitments of any historian who chooses to write in this vein: to be a philologist beyond facts (since facts are valuable mainly for the basic issues that they raise) and a philosopher beyond systems (since basic issues are valuable mainly for their singular realization in history). This "third way" for historiography refuses teleologies as utter pessimisms, and it recognizes the historical being (Dasein, Leben) -the utter complexity-of each and every culture. Burckhardt would go so far as to say that authentic history is deformed, not just by ideas that issue from preconceived theories, but even or especially by ideas that issue from chronology itself. History should be, he argued, an effort that dislodges us from our fundamental incapacity to "understand that which is varied and accidental" (unsere Unfähigkeit des Verständnisses für das Bunte, Zufällige). 45 This conception of temporality is unusual in that it has no need for the concepts "good" and "evil," and no need for either beginnings (sources from which all else must derive) or ends (historical meanings on which all else must converge). Good and evil, beginnings and ends, are not essential to accounting for the complexity, the impurity, of historical life. Temporality on this model is a dialectic of rhizomes, repetitions, symptoms. Localized history -patriotic or
racial history -is completely foreign to it, because contextualist historiography, like contextualist philosophy and anthropology, has been incapable of theorizing relationships of difference with any cogency and conviction. But neither is universal history the objective of Burckhardt's "third way." He refused, from the commencement of his career, to seek a formula, however intricate, that would bring the rhizomes, repetitions, and symptoms into a general system:
The philosophers, encumbered with speculations on origins, ought by rights to speak of the future. We can dispense with theories of origins, and no one can expect from us a theory of the end. . . . Questions such as the influence of soil and climate are introductory questions . . . for the philosophers of history, but not for us, and hence quite outside our scope. The same holds good for all cosmologies, theories of race, the geography of the three ancient continents, and so on. . . . The study of any other branch of knowledge may begin with origins, but not that of history. After all, our historical pictures are, for the most part, pure constructions, as we shall see more particularly when we come to speak of the State. . . . There is little value in conclusions drawn from people to people or from race to race. The origins we imagine we can demonstrate are in any case quite late stages. 46
The preference for contextualist (localized) history results from an eagerness for convenience-for information that can be coped with, labeled, managed, packaged -but its accessibility depends on an optical illusion, and the eagerness may be accompanied by willful blindness. The capacity to tolerate and deal with an absence of differentiable periods and episteme (to live with an oceanic, unanalyzable unity, lacking beginning, end, and formulable meaning) is to say the least a rare power. Those who, like Burckhardt and especially Warburg, can see their way to tolerating historical impurity are often moved aside, with the subtlest gestures, by other scholars who do not share or understand that power. In the case of Panofsky and Gombrich's treatment of Warburg, the adversarial feelings that arose out of intolerance, misunderstanding, and perhaps fear were presented as (more simply) condescension to imperfect scholarship. Some of the finest sensibilities have in this way been "corrected" off the map of our intellectual life.
It is not so much, then, for the sake of justice as for our own peace of mind that we reverse the exorcism of such affronted and beneficial ghosts. 
